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ABSTRACT 
 
MARKET POWER AND PURCHASING POWER PARITY: 
 A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
 
 
Vural, Hakan 
 
Master of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Neil Arnwine 
 
September, 2004 
 
 
In this thesis, the effect of market power on exchange rate is analyzed in a general 
equilibrium Lucas’s tree type model. The basic hypothesis that explains the level of the 
exchange rate is the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which predicts that money has the same 
purchasing power in each country. Research on exchange rates and goods prices has moved to 
an examination of the importance of imperfect competition in international markets.  In the 
field of international economics, models of imperfect competition have been proposed to 
explain the response of import and import-competing prices to exchange rate changes.  In this 
study imperfectly competitive relation between foreign and domestic firms is investigated 
under market power. Our theoretical analysis defines and measures the effects of market 
power on export and import prices and their relative amounts. Our results indicate that market 
power affects the composition of a country’s consumption in terms of import and 
domestically produced goods because of the effect on the prices at home and abroad. 
  Keywords: Market Power, Purchasing Power Parity,Imperfect Competition 
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ÖZET 
 
PAZAR GÜCÜ VE SATINALMA PARİTESİ: 
 
BİR GENEL DENGE MODELİ 
 
Vural, Hakan 
 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
 
Tez Danışmanı:Yrd. Doç. Dr. Neil Arnwine 
 
Eylül, 2004 
 
 
           Bu tezde, bütçe sınırlı Lucas ağaç modeli kullanılarak pazar gücünün döviz kurlarına 
olan etkisi bir denge modelinde incelenmiştir. Döviz kuru seviyesini açıklayan en temel 
hipotez, paranın her ülkede aynı miktarda mal alması gerektiğini öne süren satınalma gücü 
paritesidir. Döviz kurları üstündeki çalışmalar uluslararası piyasalarda eksik rekabetin 
önemini inceleyen bir yöne doğru kaymıştır. Uluslararası iktisat alanında, döviz kurlarındaki 
değişim sonucu ithal ve yerel malların fiyatlarındaki tepkileri açıklamak için eksik rekabet 
modelleri kurulmuştur. Bu çalışmada yerel ve yabancı firmaların eksik rekabet ortamdaki 
ilişkisi pazar gücü adı altında incelenmiştir. Yaptığımız bu teorik analiz, pazar gücünün ihraç 
ve ithal malların fiyat ve bağıl tüketim oranlarını bulur. Bulduğumuz sonuçlar, pazar gücünün  
bir ülkenin tüketim kalemindeki malların  yerel ve ithal cinsinden bağıl tüketim oranları 
konusunda belirleyici olduğunu göstermiştir.  
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Pazar Gücü, Satınalma Paritesi, Eksik Rekabet 
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  CHAPTER 1 
     INTRODUCTION 
The basic hypothesis that explains the level of the exchange rate is the Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP), which predicts that money has the same purchasing power in each 
country. Thus if one dollar buys roughly 1,400,000 TL1 as in 2004; then according to the 
PPP hypothesis, the one dollar would purchase the same quantity of goods in United 
States that the 1,400,000 TL would in Turkey. Another way to express the same idea is 
that the price level is the same in all currencies, converted at the ruling exchange rate. 
Purchasing power parity is defined under two subtitles: 
i- Absolute purchasing power parity means that the exchange rate is equal to the 
ratio of two national price levels. An equilibrium exchange rate is such that two currencies 
purchase the same amount of goods and services in the two economies. Let  p denote the 
home currency price level, p* the home currency price in a different country, and e the 
exchange rate of initial country's currency per unit of latter one's. Absolute purchasing 
power parity theory of exchange rates implies that: 
  p=ep* 
 
                                                 
1 A rough average value for 2004  
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The existence of absolute PPP hinges upon the lack of frictions across economies. 
The transportation, distribution and resale of goods must be costless for absolute 
purchasing power parity to be insured. Because these assumptions are unlikely to hold in 
practice, the absolute version is modified. 
ii- Relative purchasing power parity implies that changes in the exchange rate are 
equal to changes in relative national price levels. Suppose that the above frictions give rise 
to a stable price differential across two markets. In this case, we have: 
   p=α ep* 
 
where α  is the real exchange rate or, alternatively, (α  x 100) is the home currency price 
level as a percentage of the foreign. If α  remains constant over time, then common 
currency prices change in the same way over time in two countries, and the relative 
purchasing power parity holds.  
A further extension, the ‘law of one price’ states that the domestic market price 
depends on the world market price of the good in domestic currency plus the proportional 
tariff levied on the product by domestic government and the cost of transporting the 
product to the domestic market. In this study we examine how variations of the degree of 
market power of a good across countries can cause deviations of the exchange rate away 
from PPP. 
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CHAPTER 2 
  HISTORY 
 
This chapter begins with the history of ideas on exchange rates and continues with 
a survey of theoretical and empirical studies. The causes of fluctuations in real exchange 
rates and deviations from the Purchasing Power Parity are examined. The chapter ends 
with the uses of this hypothesis and its application in modern view.  
PPP is one of the oldest and also one of the most controversial doctrines in 
economics. Scholars of the Salamanca School in sixteenth century Spain first articulate it 
as an empirical proposition which states that national price levels should be equal when 
converted to a common currency( Kenneth Rogoff 1996). Prior to World War I most 
countries adhered to gold standard stating that different currencies were convertible to 
gold at fixed parities. For later times, Rogoff (1996:648) points out that:  
 
After the outbreak of World War I; the world financial system and the 
gold standard collapsed because returning to the prewar exchange rates 
was impossible due to vastly differing inflation experiences during the 
war. Besides, speculators became concerned that countries would devalue 
their currencies to gain seignorage revenues.  
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The debate on restoring the financial system pointed the modern origins of purchasing 
power parity. Gustav Cassel, the Swedish economist proposed calculating cumulative 
Consumer Price Index inflation rates from the beginning of 1914 and use these inflation 
differentials to calculate the exchange rate that satisfy the PPP (For a summery of Cassel's 
work see Officer, 1976). Even though there has always been a debate on holding of PPP 
hypothesis alternative explanations could not have been presented for a long time. The 
very high volatility of real exchange rates during 1970s float refuted the Purchasing 
Power Parity Hypothesis and prelude of the alternatives - the hypothesis of random walk- 
became a popular field to be studied. 
 
2.1 Empirical Findings 
There is a long-standing questioning of purchasing power parity. Some studies 
proposed the hypothesis of random walk (no convergence toward PPP) behavior in real 
exchange rates, which rejected the ability of models based on purchasing power parity 
hypothesis to provide a satisfactory explanation on exchange rates. If the real exchange 
rate is a random walk, then there is no long term equilibrium value to which the real 
exchange rate tends to return. In terms of time series characteristics, if real exchange 
rates are non-stationary, then PPP does not hold in the long run. Adler and Lehman 
(1983) have failed to reject the random walk hypothesis for exchange rates empirically, 
Rush and Husted (1985) have found that purchasing power parity does not hold between  
 
 
 
  5 
Italy and Germany and between Italy and France, although it holds between France and 
Germany. These findings and the judgement could be explained by considering that 
exchange rates and their rates of change have been more volatile than relative price levels 
and rates of inflation. Even though Baillie and Selover (1987), Meese and Rogoff (1988), 
and Mark (1990) have rejected stationarity and long-run PPP, the ever-growing empirical 
literature has arrived a consensus on real exchange rates. They conclude that exchange 
rates tend toward PPP in the very long run.2  
Developing statistical and econometric methods built a stronger long-run 
purchasing power parity hypothesis. Despite the objections emphasizing that the data 
period for recent float alone may be too short; Abuaf and Jorion (1990) increased the 
power of their tests by using larger time series and rejected the random walk hypothesis 
for the real exchange rate. Diebold, Husted and Rush (1991) have applied fractional 
integration techniques  and found evidence of long run purchasing power parity. Whitt 
(1992) tested for both CPI and WPI of European countries, Japan and Australia and the 
results corroborated those of Abuaf and Jorion (1990) rejecting the random walk 
hypothesis. Huang (1990) decomposed the deviations into a forward exchange risk 
premium component and a percentage real interest rate differential component and 
concluded in his empirical study that deviations from purchasing power parity exhibit 
well-documented empirical regularity. Recent applied study on long-run purchasing 
power parity among major industrialized economies seem to be turning in favour of  long- 
 
 
                                                 
2 These studies include Whitt (1992),  Abuaf and Jorion (1990) and  Deloach(1997).  
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run purchasing power parity hypothesis (e.g., MacDonald 1993).  
 
2.2 Theoretical Explanation  
There are studies demonstrating that deviations from purchasing power parity are 
consistent with other theoretical explanations such as martingale behavior. Adler and 
Lehmann (1983) derived the Martingale model of PPP deviations, which was valid for 
both fixed and flexible exchange rate periods, for a wide variety of countries. This model 
proposed that the real exchange rate follows martingale, a stochastic process in which 
successive increments are unpredictable. 
Meese and Rogoff (1988) have argued that shocks have a completely permanent 
effect on the levels of real exchange rates and the changes are unpredictable which 
supports the martingale explanation. However, the objection came with a very basic 
intuition by Diebold, Husted and Rush (1991: 1253-1254).  
 
They argue that there is little or no tendency for nominal exchange rates 
and prices to adjust in such a way as to promote purchasing power parity. 
We find such a behavior of real exchange rate to be economically 
implausible. The real exchange rate is relative price. Accepting the 
hypothesis of nonstationarity of the real exchange rate implies that it can, 
and will, take on any value in finite time. The potential for such wide-
ranging behavior of the relative price of one nation's goods seems 
unlikely. 
 
 
This study posed a serious challenge to the opinion that deviations from PPP can 
be explained by martingales. MacDonald and Marsh (1997) adopted a simultaneous-
equation modeling strategy to produce dynamic exchange rate models which were shown 
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to produce  significantly better forecasts than the benchmark random walk. However 
Cassel's (1916) assertion that ''monetary flows, affecting domestic prices would continue 
until parity is achieved'' has been criticized for being unrealistic for various reasons which 
are discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
2.2.1 Non-Traded Goods 
Many goods and services do not enter into international trade i.e. a haircut is 
classified as a non-tradable service between two countries. Balassa (1964) proposed that 
instead of attempting to rely on aggregate indexes, more attention should be paid to the 
behavior of sectoral indexes with appropriate separation in terms of tradable (agricultural 
and manufacturing) and non-tradable (service) goods and proposes that the deviation 
from PPP is expected potentially to be large for non-tradable goods and the relative price 
of the non-traded commodity will be higher in the country with higher productivity (or 
income) levels than in the other. Bergstrand (1991) answers the question  whether 
equilibrium exchange rates vary systematically across countries and finds the evidence 
which suggests strongly that they do. “Prices tend to be higher in countries with higher per 
capita GDP, with higher capital/labor ratios and with greater differentials in labor 
productivity between tradeables and non-tradeables”. Neary(1988) built the mathematical 
model of determinants of the equilibrium real exchange rate and his approach showed that 
a number of results in the literature on small open economies are special cases of a general  
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phenomenon: ''Changes in exogenous variables are more likely to lead to a real 
appreciation the greater their effect on the demand for and the smaller  their effect on the 
supply of nontraded relative to traded goods.''  
 
2.2.2 Taxation,Transportation and Other Frictions 
Absolute PPP theory is well known to be incorrect for three reasons observable in 
practical life. First is indirect taxation: new cars cost more in Turkey than in other 
European countries because they are more heavily taxed in Turkey.3 The second reason is 
the trade barriers set by government and third one is transportation costs. Dornbusch 
(1988) pointed out that: ''The thought that PPP governs exchange rates is only appropriate 
to  a world where equilibrium relative prices never change. If they change a lot because 
real disturbances are large, then PPP is best forgotten.''4 Besides, Aizenman’s (1984) 
theoretical model integrated deviations from purchasing power parity with an analysis of 
the determinants of the exchange rate which considers the transaction costs and states 
that purchasing power parity should hold better between neighboring countries and 
between countries with larger potential trade. Parsley and Shang-Jin Wei (1996) 
determined the rate of convergence to PPP to be higher among cities in the United States, 
which are without trade barriers than cross countries.  
 
2.2.3 Government Spending 
Some popular empirical theory of the real exchange rate concludes that sustained 
current account deficits are associated with long-run real exchange rate depreciation. 
                                                 
3 Ö.T.V. tax on V.A.T. is 27% to 50 % by law 12/06/2002. 
4 This conclusion is supported in 1980s.   
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Krugman (1990) argues that current accounts are likely to induce significant real 
exchange rate changes because they lead to transfers of wealth across countries. Another 
consideration that is sometimes emphasized in making adjustments to purchasing power 
parity is the level of government spending. Froot and Rogoff (1991) found that 
government spending is a significant determinant of the real exchange rate. They reason 
that this effect is observed because relative to private spending, government spending 
tends to fall more heavily on non-traded goods. Therefore a rise in government spending 
leads to an increase in the real exchange rate . 
 
2.3 Uses of PPP 
Today PPP is applied by policymakers to many problems i.e. determining the 
initial exchange rate for a newly independent country, forecasting the long run exchange 
rates, adjusting the price differentials in international comparisons of income etc. 
Researchers also use it to compare income levels across countries. Even if short-run 
deviations from purchasing power parity are large and volatile, it is a more useful way of 
comparing international living standards than market exchange rate, which is more 
volatile.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 EXCHANGE RATE MODELS 
This chapter contains the discussion of short run and long run behavior of 
exchange rates and a brief review of the models that explain the determination of level of 
exchange rates.  
 
3.1 Long-Run& Short-Run 
Purchasing power parity has variously been viewed as a theory of exchange rate 
determination weakly as a short, but more strongly as a long run equilibrium condition in  
asset markets. The literature on exchange rates has been focused on a problem: The 
question is whether equilibrium real exchange rates revert to equilibrium in the long run. 
PPP theory suggests that the answer is yes, but the empirical study on this proposition has 
faced many problems. The reason is that the equilibrium real exchange rate is not constant 
over time, for  the  trade protection level may differ over time or the relative price levels 
among countries may also change.  
Before 1970s the initial general belief on purchasing power parity supported the 
existence of a fairly stable exchange rate (e.g., Friedman and Schwartz 1963). In these 
studies Keynesian models were generally used as the macroeconomic model and the  
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developed version is the famous Mundell-Fleming model that integrated asset markets and 
capital mobility into open-economy macroeconomics. The monetary model explanation 
based on flexible price assumes continuous purchasing power parity and defines the 
exchange rate as the relative price of two monies. The model defines relative price in 
terms of relative supply and demand of those monies. The demand for money is assumed 
to depend on real income, the price level, and the level of the nominal interest rate. An 
important assumption in the flexible price monetary model is continuous purchasing 
power parity; the domestic money supply determines the domestic price level and hence 
the exchange rate is determined by relative money supplies. The very high volatility of 
real exchange rates during 1970s float, conspicuously refuting the assumption of 
continuous purchasing power parity, led to the development of three further classes of 
models; sticky price monetary models, equilibrium models and portfolio balance model. 
 
 
        
  3.1.1 Sticky Price Models 
          Sticky price monetary models, e.g. Dornbusch (1976), allow short-term 
overshooting of the nominal and real exchange rates above their long-run equilibrium 
levels. Assume that there is a cut in the  nominal domestic money supply, there will occur 
an initial fall in the real money supply and a consequent rise in interest rates in order to 
clear the money market since goods prices are sticky in the short run. A capital inflow and  
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appreciation of the nominal exchange rate will occur because of the rise in domestic 
interest rates. Investors are aware of a risk that that they may suffer a foreign exchange 
loss when they are repaying liabilities in foreign currency for the value of the domestic 
currency is  artificially high. However, risk neutral investors will continue to borrow from 
abroad and use it to buy domestic assets, so long as the expected foreign exchange loss 
(expected rate of depreciation) is less than the known capital market gain (the interest 
differential). A short-run equilibrium is achieved when the expected rate of depreciation is 
just equal to the interest differential. Because the expected rate of depreciaton is related 
with interest rate differential, the exchange rate must have overshot its long-run 
equilibrium (purchasing power parity level). In the medium run, however, domestic prices 
begin to fall in response to the fall in money supply. This alleviates pressure in the money 
market (the real money supply rises) and domestic interest rates begin to decline. The 
exchange rate then depreciates slowly to long-run purchasing power parity.  
 
  
          3.1.2 General Equilibrium Models 
 
Equilibrium exchange rate models are developed originally by Alan Stockman 
(1980) and Robert Lucas (1982). These studies analyze the general equilibrium of a two 
country model. They assume agents holding local currency (the accepted medium of 
exchange to purchase goods) and maximize the expected present value of a representative 
agent's utility, subject to budget and cash-in-advance constraints. In an important sense,  
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equilibrium models are an extension, or generalization of the flexible price monetary 
models to allow for multiple traded goods  and real shocks across countries. A simple 
equilibrium model can be sketched by considering a two-country, two-good world in 
which prices are flexible and markets are in equilibrium, as in the flexible-price monetary 
model. In contrast to the monetary model, agents distinguish between domestic and 
foreign goods in terms of well-defined preferences. Stockman's (1980) theoretical model 
proposed that deviations from purchasing power parity and exchange rate volatility can be 
consistent with equilibrium, 
 
 
 3.1.3 The Portfolio Balance Model 
The key distinguishing feature of the portfolio balance model approach to 
exchange rate is the assumed imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign 
assets. Wealth is divided into three components: money, domestically issued bonds and 
foreign bonds. Trade balance depends positively on the level of the real exchange rate 
and an open market purchase of domestic bonds result in a fall of domestic interest rate 
and a depreciation of domestic currency, Taylor (1995). The extent of empirical study on 
this model is much less than the monetary class of models because of the problems in 
mapping theoretical portfolio balance models into real world financial data.  
 
 
 
  14 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
                          MARKET POWER MODEL 
This chapter introduces our model and continues with the calibration results and a 
discussion. The market power is defined and export-import, domestic-foreign price 
equations are presented in this chapter, and are followed by the results of the calibration 
and discussion of the major findings from these estimations.  
Fitoussi and Le Cacheux (1988) criticized floating exchange rates for 
demonstrating large and persistent movements in currency values, both nominal and real, 
with apparently no tendency for purchasing power parity to assert itself either in the 
aggregate or on a product basis. There is growing evidence that ‘the law of one price’ does 
not seem to hold even for tradable goods and price-cost markups display large and 
persistent fluctuations. Research on exchange rates and goods prices has moved to an 
examination of the importance of imperfect competition in international markets 
(Goldberg and Knetter 1997). The imperfectly competitive relation between foreign and 
domestic firms can be investigated under market power. Market power occurs when one 
buyer or seller in a market has ability to exert significant influence over the price or 
quantity of goods and services traded. Simply, market power does not exist when there is  
 
 
  15 
perfect competition but it does when there is a monopoly or oligopoly. It is worth here to 
emphasize the relation between integration and segmentation and the nature of 
competition. Any perfectly competitive market is characterized by the condition that price 
equals marginal cost. Therefore a perfectly competitive market must be integrated 
(geography or nationality do not have systematic effects on transaction prices). 
 A segmented market (i.e., where location of buyers and sellers influences the 
terms of the transaction by more than the marginal cost of physically moving the good 
from one location to another) implies the existence of market power; because buyers face 
different prices, not all buyers face a price equal to marginal cost (Goldberg and Knetter 
1997). In the field of international economics, models of imperfect competition have been 
proposed to explain the response of import and import-competing prices to exchange rate 
changes.5 Knetter(1993) finds that a monopolist that price discriminates across export 
destinations reduces markup to buyers whose currencies  have depreciated against the 
seller. In the case of countries managing their exchange rate, it also suggests that if some 
kind of purchasing power parity or relative cost parity policy is pursued, it may lead to 
sustained trade imbalances (Fitoussi and Le Cacheux 1988). Knetter (1989) claimed 
accounts of U.S. experience cite the failure of dollar prices of imported goods to rise in 
proportion to exchange rates (i.e. incomplete pass through) as an important factor in 
explaining the persistence of the trade deficit. This is a case that may characterize the 
current situation in Turkey by 2004.  
Hazledine (1980) proposed a model, which is termed the ‘market power model’,  
 
 
                                                 
5 See for example, Dornbusch, 1987 
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and ested both it and the law of one price against some cross-sectional data on differences 
between Canadian and  US prices. The market-power model fitted the data rather better 
than the law of one price. In the model the assumption that imports are perfect substitutes 
for domestic output is dropped. In the market power pricing model of  Hazledine (1980); 
domestic price is determined as a weighted sum of domestic cost  and substitute price in 
addition to entry-barrier factors (tariff and transportation  costs) which are included in the 
law of one price model. Dornbusch (1987) explained the adjustment of relative prices to 
exchange rate movements in an industrial organization approach with the prediction that 
appreciation should lead to a decline in the price of imports.  The extent of price 
adjustment is shown to depend on product substitutability, the relative number of domestic 
and foreign firms, and market structure.  In the case of homogeneous goods, domestic 
firms fully match the decline in price. If products are differentiated relative price of the 
imported brands declines in response to an appreciation. The extent of the decline depends 
on a measure of competition and on the relative number of home and foreign firms.  
 
 
           
4.1 The Model 
          I consider a two-country and two-good world. Each country is specialized in the 
production of one good, which can be consumed domestically or sold in the other country. 
The representative consumer in each country consumes both goods.  This is a Lucas’ tree  
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type model, meaning that production is exogenous in each country. I assume that 
ownership of the production process is restricted to be held domestically. I also imagine 
that the household consists of a worker-shopper pair.  The worker sells the tree’s output 
while the shopper purchases in the market. The consumer receives a dividend from 
ownership of the firms. This dividend consists of domestic currency for locally sold goods 
and foreign currency for exported goods.  
 
 
 
 
4.1.1 The Consumer’s Problem 
          Country A specializes in the production of good 1 and country B specializes in the 
production of good 2. Since each country’s problem is symmetric to the other, I will focus 
on A’s problem. Superscripts delineate the country and subscripts delineate the good. The 
superscript A has been suppressed for clarity. Country A’s representative consumer is 
subject to a budget constraint. The consumer’s budget constraint is presented in real 
terms: 
 
( )
e
xp
xypcpcp
B ⋅+−⋅=⋅+⋅ 112211                                                                        (1) 
 
 The left hand side of equation (1) shows how the consumer allocates his wealth. 
The consumer consumes the domestically produced good and the foreign good. Both 
goods are priced in domestic currency. A portion of output, x, is exported to country B 
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and the remaining, y-x, is sold locally. The first term on the right side represents revenue 
from domestic sales. The second term represents revenue from exports as the foreign 
spending on good 1, converted into domestic currency using the market exchange rate, e. 
 
In equilibrium the following equilibrium conditions should apply: 
 
{ } { }BAjipp
xx
x
yx
j
i
j
i
BB
BBB
cc
yc
c
,,2,1,
, 21
2
1
===
==
≤+
≤+
                                                                                      (2) 
 
The first two lines imply that a country can consume and export less than or equal to its 
output level. Note that good 1 is produced only by country A and good 2 is produced only 
by country B. Since the output is either consumed domestically or exported, the export 
level of one country should be equal to foreign good (import) consumption of the other 
country.  
 
 
          4.1.2 Optimization 
Both the domestic and foreign produced goods enter the utility function, providing 
a motive for foreign trade.  I assume the following utility function: 
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By placing market-clearing conditions in the budget constraint we can find: 
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Note that in stationary equilibrium the exchange rate supports trade balance. 
 
 
 
The consumer’s problem can be posed as a Lagrangian equation problem: 
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which is subject to the budget constraint and market clearing conditions. The consumer 
selects consumption levels of both goods and the level of exports subject to his budget 
constraint. The first order conditions are: 
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0111 =⋅−= λpc uλ   (6) 
 
0222 =λ⋅−= pucλ   (7) 
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Here, the firm potentially has market power. The price is a function of the quantitysold in 
each market. Combining equations 6 and 7, I obtain the following optimal condition 
governing the total spending on goods 1 and 2:  
 
cpcp 2211 1
⋅⋅α−
α=⋅   (9) 
 
 
4.1.3 Introducing Market Power 
 
The innovation of this paper is to introduce market power. Let us define the 
following market power parameters: 
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The terms { }2,1, =Θ ii  represents the market power of good i in country B relative 
to country A. If the parameter is one then the market power is the same in each country's 
market. This could be perfect competition in each market, but it does not have to be. 
Values of iΘ  between 0 and 1 imply that there is more market power in country B's 
market, so the price is higher in B hence there is less consumption there and more in 
country A. Values between 1 and infinity, imply that there is more market power in 
country A, so there is higher prices in A.  
 
        For the purposes of this paper I assume that iΘ  are exogenously determined.  
First consider the case in which good is sold in perfectly competitive markets in each 
country. In this case iΘ =1 and purchasing power parity holds for the good. More 
generally iΘ =1 does not imply that each market is competitive, it would be preferable to 
derive Θ  endogenously within the model by allowing for multiple firms to compete in 
each market in each country, however, this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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 The exchange rate can be represented as: 
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We see here that if there is market power, i.e. if the price of a good responds to the 
quantity sold, then the exchange rate deviates from purchasing power parity. 
 
 
We can now write the exchange rate from equation 12 as: 
{ }2,1, =Θ⋅= i
p
p
e i
i
B
i   (13) 
 
Therefore the degree of relative market power determines the amount of deviation 
from purchasing power parity for the good. At one extreme we have iΘ =1. There is equal 
market power in each country’s market for the good so purchasing power parity holds.  
 
1=Θ i   (14) 
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            Country B’s Problem: 
 
I assume that country B’s problem is symmetric to country A’s problem.  I do, 
however, allow for a different weighting in B’s utility function:   
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1,ln1ln
1,
1
1,
21
11
2121
=ψϕ−+ϕ=
≠ψ

 ⋅⋅ψ−=
ψ−ϕ−ϕ
BB
BBBBB
cc
ccccu
 (15) 
 
The model has eleven unknowns. Four consumption levels, four prices, two Lagrange 
multipliers and the exchange rate are found by combining nine equations. The equations, 
which are listed in the Appendix, consist of the first order conditions for the consumer in 
each country, the budget constraints and the market clearing conditions. 
       I am free to pick two numerairé governing the absolute, as opposed to relative 
price level in each country. I selected the home good price in each country such that the 
goods prices have symmetric appearance across goods and countries. 
 
 
( ) yc ⋅α+Θ⋅α−
α=
1
1 1
  (16) 
 
( ) Byc ⋅ϕ+Θ⋅ϕ−
ϕ=
2
2 1
  (17) 
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( )
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( )
( ) BB yc ⋅ϕ+Θ⋅ϕ−
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2
2
2 1
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1
1 1
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( )
( ) 1
1
1
1
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1
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y
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( )
2
2
2
2
2
1
Θ⋅⋅ϕ
ϕ+Θ⋅ϕ−=Θ
⋅= BB y
pep  numerairé (23) 
 
1=e   (24) 
 
       We can see from equation that purchasing power parity holds when the market 
power of a good is equal in different countries and 1=e  under our numerairé. 
Consumption is a share of output, with share given by utility function parameter α  or ϕ   
  25 
and price is decreasing in output. This includes the case of competitive markets.  A larger 
value of { }2,1, =Θ ii  means that; there is more market power in country A than in 
country B. When the seller has market power, he does not take the price levels as given 
hence price changes with quantity. Increasing { }2,1, =Θ ii  reduces the quantity sold in 
A’s market in favor of B’s. This drives up A’s price of the good and reduces B’s price. 
Country A residents benefit from low values of { }2,1, =Θ ii . 
 
 
 
          4.1.4 Real Exchange Rate 
 
First let us examine the implicit exchange rate defined by looking at a single good. 
For each good, the real exchange rate for that good is defined: 
{ }2,1, =Θ=⋅≡ i
p
per iB
i
i
i                                                                (25) 
Now moving to the market exchange rate, the real exchange rate defined by the trade-
weighted average of goods is: 
( )∏ Θ=
=
n
i
w
i
ir
1
                                                               (26) 
where iw  is the trade weight share of good i.  We can rewrite this real market exchange 
rate as: 
∑ Θ=
=
n
i
iiwr
1
lnln .                                                               (27) 
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Perfect competition in every market implies that the real exchange rate is one.  
More generally, the real exchange rate will be one if the geometric weighted product of 
individual market powers is one.  That is, if market power in one market is counter-
balanced by a reciprocal weakness in another market.  In our simple model the trade 
weight shares are equal at ½ for each good, so we observe 1=r  if and only if 
2
1
1
Θ=Θ .  
If the real exchange rate is smaller (larger) than one for a country then that country 
possesses an overall market power (weakness) relative to the other country. 
 
Note that if we neglect to employ logs in equation 27, to obtain: 
∑ Θ⋅=
=
n
i
iiwr
1
                                                              (28) 
then we may be introducing an apparent deviation from purchasing power parity where 
none actually exists.  Consider our example above in which 
2
1
1
Θ=Θ .    Clearly we 
should obtain 1=r .  However, if equation 296 is mistakenly used then: 
 
1
2
1
12
1 1
Θ⋅+Θ⋅=r                                                                 (29) 
We would only conclude that 1=r  if all markets were competitive.  The use of equation 
29 may introduce apparent deviations from purchasing power parity where none exist. 
                                                 
6 Or any other weighted sum. 
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4.2. Calibration Analysis 
In the previous section we obtained closed-form solutions for the endogenous 
variables.  Below illustrations will be helpful to exhibit the intuition behind mathematical 
solutions. I took α ,ϕ ,ψ ,ψ B values as 0,5. The income values for countries A and B are 
10 and same. The market power in country B is 1.  These values are chosen for simplicity 
and symmetry. Results are similar for different parameter values. They demonstrate the 
effect of market power on consumption and price levels in home and abroad.  The data 
used for the calibration can be found in Table 1. 
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Figure1: Domestic consumption level as a percentage of production with respect to 
change in market power (Equation 16). 
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Figure2: Domestic price level with respect to change in market power (Equation 20) 
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  Figure 3: Foreign market price of the product with respect to 
change in market power (Equation21) 
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Figure 4: Foreign market consumption level of the product as a percentage of total 
consumption with respect to market power (Equation 18).  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 In this study, we investigate the behavior of export-import prices and their relative 
amounts. Deviations from purchasing power parity are empirical fact and it is hardly 
explained by usual frictions in international trade i.e. taxation and transportation costs. 
Our theoretical model relates the deviations from purchasing power parity with the 
characteristic of the market which strengthens our approach to an equilibrium exchange 
rate.  The recent analyses suggest that, with imperfect competition, firms may be able to 
charge a different price for their product on each specific market. In international media 
firms make destination specific adjustments in response to exchange rate changes, which 
is referred to in the literature as pricing-to-market. We have explained the rationality of 
this phenomenon in our theoretical model. In the case of open economies with flexible 
exchange rates, the analyses suggests that a combination of integrated world capital 
markets and geographically segmented goods markets will often produce instability in 
response to shocks originating in policy changes (i.e. Turkey’s foreign trade imbalance 
after 2001 devaluation). Our theoretical analysis involves estimating the effects on exports 
and imports of a country when there is market power, price changes, and deviations from 
purchasing power parity. 
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As the market power increases in a country then a good’s price will go up and 
consumption will go down in this country, however the same effect causes the price of the 
good to go down and consumption level to go up in the other country. Purchasing power 
parity holds when both markets are perfectly competitive or there is equal market power 
in both countries. Since obtaining equal market power for various goods is harder to 
observe, the condition of perfectly competitive markets will give a more general intuition. 
This study helps us to understand behavior of markets and firms to real shocks and change 
in the market structure. The economic interpretation of the fluctuations on prices and 
exchange rates has become clearer. Knetter (1993) implies that: “Future research should 
attempt to explain pricing to market on the basis of observable industry characteristics”. 
We have filled some part of this gap and reasoned the deviations from purchasing power 
parity reality in a general equilibrium model and our market power definition has served 
as the observable industry characteristics. Determining the level of market power with its 
sources are the next topics on the agenda in this area of research. By using Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) or Four Firm Concentration Ratio the market power can be 
represented quantitatively and further econometric studies can be performed. Hence this 
study opens a new gate in the exchange rate economics. Besides by the help of 
understanding market power among international markets we can examine economic 
importance of international trade policies among sectors. However, since competitors are 
changing rapidly, the tools used to measure departures from competition may not be 
economically significant and applicable.  
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APPENDIX A 
          Here I list the equations used to solve the model. The unknowns are: 
 
       Endogenous variables: BBBBB ccccppppe λλ,,,,,,,,,, 22112211  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
 
α 0,5  y 10  ψ 0,5 
1−α 0,5  y_B 10  1−ψ 0,5 
ϕ 0,5  Θ_1 * * *  ψ_Β 0,5 
1−ϕ 0,5  Θ_2 1  1−ψ_Β 0,5 
        
 
Table 1:Parameter Values 
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Θ_1 c_1 C_2 c_1B c_2B p_1 p_2 p_1B p_2B λ u 
0,0 10 5 0 5 0,1000 0,2000 - - - 0,2000 1,3296 4,6469 
0,0 10 5 0 5 0,1001 0,2000 100,1000 0,2000 1,3292 4,6462 
0,2 8 5 2 5 0,1200 0,2000 0,6000 0,2000 1,2703 4,5267 
0,3 8 5 2 5 0,1300 0,2000 0,4333 0,2000 1,2452 4,4764 
0,4 7 5 3 5 0,1400 0,2000 0,3500 0,2000 1,2223 4,4311 
0,5 7 5 3 5 0,1500 0,2000 0,3000 0,2000 1,2014 4,3900 
0,6 6 5 4 5 0,1600 0,2000 0,2667 0,2000 1,1822 4,3525 
0,7 6 5 4 5 0,1700 0,2000 0,2429 0,2000 1,1644 4,3181 
0,8 6 5 4 5 0,1800 0,2000 0,2250 0,2000 1,1479 4,2863 
0,9 5 5 5 5 0,1900 0,2000 0,2111 0,2000 1,1325 4,2569 
1,0 5 5 5 5 0,2000 0,2000 0,2000 0,2000 1,1180 4,2295 
1,1 5 5 5 5 0,2111 0,2000 0,1900 0,2000 1,1030 4,2012 
1,3 4 5 6 5 0,2250 0,2000 0,1800 0,2000 1,0856 4,1686 
1,4 4 5 6 5 0,2429 0,2000 0,1700 0,2000 1,0651 4,1305 
1,7 4 5 6 5 0,2667 0,2000 0,1600 0,2000 1,0404 4,0854 
2,0 3 5 7 5 0,3000 0,2000 0,1500 0,2000 1,0103 4,0308 
2,5 3 5 7 5 0,3500 0,2000 0,1400 0,2000 0,9721 3,9630 
3,3 2 5 8 5 0,4333 0,2000 0,1300 0,2000 0,9215 3,8757 
5,0 2 5 8 5 0,6000 0,2000 0,1200 0,2000 0,8495 3,7561 
1000,0 0 5 10 5 100,1000 0,2000 0,1001 0,2000 0,2364 3,0568 
 
Table2:Calibration Results(Equilibrium Values as a Function of the Market Power)
